: Leaving Afghanistan Was the Right Call, But It May Haunt Biden—and the U.S.—Forever #WorldNEWS The last week saw the unceremonious end to the longest military adventure in American history. The

Leaving Afghanistan Was the Right Call, But It May Haunt Biden—and the U.S.—Forever #WorldNEWS
The last week saw the unceremonious end to the longest military adventure in American history. The botched withdrawal from Afghanistan is the first major foreign policy crisis of the Biden administration and surely the largest since 9/11. It is also largely self-inflicted.
The failure lies not in the decision to exit Afghanistan but in the way the U. S. went about leaving. Indeed, the decision to leave—made initially by Trump and ratified by Biden—remains strategically sound. But as the tragic events of the past week have shown, making the right decision is one thing, carrying it out well is an entirely different story.
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It is a failure that could cost President Biden, and America, more than they bargained for.
Why was withdrawal the right call?
Biden inherited a broken peace process and the prospect of a renewed conflict with a strengthened Taliban if he reneged on Trump’s commitments. This is not to say that his hands were inextricably tied. He could have chosen to continue the fight. However, as the record shows and he expressed clearly in his address to the nation on August 16, Biden himself has long believed that the U. S. should draw down its presence in Afghanistan. For several reasons, he’s right.
The mission the American people were sold was accomplished; the war that followed was unwinnable. On October 6, 2001, President Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban: shut down al-Qaeda’s base of operations, close their training facilities, and hand over Osama bin Laden. The Taliban refused. The U. S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom in response to 9/11, with the goal to eliminate a clear and present danger to the homeland and to punish those responsible for the worst attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor. At the war’s height in 2002, the mission was immensely popular, with 93 percent of Americans supporting the invasion. Within six months of beginning it was a resounding success, having swiftly decimated al-Qaeda, rooted out the Taliban, and forced bin Laden into hiding.
But then mission creep set in. Without a mandate from the American people, the goal pivoted from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency and “nation-building. ” Operational success and public support cratered as a result. As it turns out, the original mission was the only achievable mission. As soon as the adversary ceased to be an existential threat to the homeland, the public (understandably) lost stomach for the war. The Taliban were always going to take over as soon as the U. S. pulled out—whether today, in one year, or in five. If 20 years and trillion couldn’t buy self-sustaining stability, no amount of additional time would.